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Befriended by Abe Goldstein
The friendship I formed with Abraham Goldstein is among the most
valuable of all the many benefits my life as a legal academic has conferred upon
me. My affectionate connection to Abe was cemented during the five years (a
lamentably brief period) that I shared with him on the Yale Law School faculty.
But my friendship with him actually commenced before I arrived in New
Haven- indeed, well before I even met Abe in person. Had I never enjoyed the
privilege of meeting him and the pleasure of becoming his colleague, I would
certainly have been deprived of many benefits - the insights reflected in his
questions at workshops and lectures; the sophistication imparted to my own
work by his generous comments; the energy and optimism with which he
infected all who worked alongside him. Yet I still could have counted myself
befriended by Abe because he chose, for no reason other than love of intellectual
exchange, to share with me and countless others his penetrating and wondrous
ideas.
Abe was an accomplished and expansive scholar. But the profound impact
he had on the formation of my own scholarly imagination was achieved
primarily through two of his works: his classic book, The Insanity Defense,' and
his masterful article, Conspiracy To Defraud the United States.
2
Like nearly all conventionally trained lawyers (having attended Harvard
Law School, I was denied the benefit of Abe's instruction as a student), and like
most aspiring criminal law scholars, I in my scholarly adolescence held the
naive belief that the proper handling of mentally impaired criminal offenders
presented an essentially doctrinal puzzle. Which of the various competing
tests - the traditional M'Naghten rule,3 the so-called irresistible impulse
1. ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967).
2. Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy To Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405 (1959).
3. See M'Naghten's Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L.).
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standard, 4 the hybrid approach of the Model Penal Code,' or the open-ended
Durham formula6 -worked best? Or should we (meaning I, as the aspiring
legal expert, eager to write a tenure piece) formulate some superior alternative
to all of these?
Then, in preparing to teach criminal law for the first time, I read Abe's
book (scandalously, I had not read it before; but, as I said, I went to Harvard
Law School), and learned that the doctrinal-puzzle-solving approach was but
an academic conceit. Based on a painstaking examination of trial transcripts,
jury instructions, case law, and judicial opinions, Abe concluded that "the
words in which the defense should be cast are still receiving far more attention
than they deserve .... The various tests do not seem very different ....
[I]dentical evidence may be admitted under each of them and juries tend to
assign much the same meaning to them."7 The meaning of the insanity defense
resides, he argued, not in abstract doctrinal formulations but in the concrete
sensibilities of those who apply them. If the system was broken, the solution
required either fixing those sensibilities or, more realistically, creating some
procedural alternative to a system that makes pre-legal sensibilities operative
for the fate of the mentally ill who are remitted to the criminal justice system.
This was, of course, a majestic display of both the working premises and
the rigorous methods of Yale legal realism.8 I had never been exposed to it,
however, in a form so compellingly applied, particularly to a subject that
mattered to me. The impact it had on my perception of how the law works - in
the adjudication of the insanity defense but essentially, I came to see,
everywhere within criminal law -was immense. I was, in effect, a different type
of scholar after reading the book, and I blanch at the thought that I might have
remained the type I was had I not read Abe's work.
Of course, I am not alone in having been affected so profoundly; Abe's
brand of realism has inspired (and been fully vindicated by) a wide-ranging
program of social science research on the insanity defense and other doctrines.9
4. See Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500, 502 (1844).
S. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962).
6. See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
7. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 213.
8. Having graduated from the Law School in 1949, and having been appointed in 1956,
Goldstein came of age as a legal thinker when realism still reigned supreme at Yale. See
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-196o (1986).
9. See, e.g., Norman J. Finkel, De Facto Departures from Insanity Instructions: Toward the
Remaking of Common Law, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 105, 112-13 (1990); Norman J. Finkel et
al., Insanity Defenses: From the Jurors' Perspective, 9 LAw & PSYCHOL. REv. 77, 83-84 (1985);
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Yet had I not had the good fortune to read Abe's book for myself, I'm not at all
confident that the wisdom it embodied would have found its way to me, for as
my own naivet6 as a young scholar attests, and as my review of the stream of
scholarship that continues to pour out on the insanity defense confirms, "the
words in which the defense should be cast are still receiving far more attention
than they deserve"'" in law schools and law journals." I'm pleased that this bit
of Abe's wisdom, at least, is never lost on any student who learns criminal law
from me at Yale.
Nor does any student of mine escape without learning the fundamental
lesson of Abe's Conspiracy To Defraud the United States. Easily the most
important article ever written on conspiracy, Conspiracy To Defraud, like
Insanity Defense, dashes a formalist conceit -namely "the old saws that federal
crime is closely defined by the legislature and that there are no judge-made
common law offenses against the United States." 2 Carefully charting its
origins and historical function, Abe shows that the federal conspiracy statute,
because of its generative incompleteness, effectively licensed the "retroactive
creation of crime by the judiciary to meet the needs of a society in transition, by
expanding old categories and creating new ones.""
Again, Abe's analysis transformed me. Not only did he puncture a dogma
that I had never been taught to recognize as such; he also cured me of the
reflexive instinct to lament in pious and trite terms supposed judicial and
legislative derogations of the legality principle. Abe wasn't sanguine about the
function of the conspiracy and other vague criminal statutes in creating a de
facto common law of crimes; rather he was realistic about it, recognizing its
inevitability, and also noting its potential for both ill and good. The lesson for
me (and for others14) is that the formation of criminal law is a dynamic and
James R. P. Ogloff, A Comparison of Insanity Defense Standards on Juror Decision Making, 15
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 509, 521, 524 (1991).
1o. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 213.
11. Many judges, I'm happy to note, have been deeply influenced. See, e.g., United States v.
Lyons, 739 F.2d 994, 995 n.7, 996 nn.8-9, 998 & nn.17-18 & 21 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rubin, J.,
dissenting).
12. Goldstein, supra note 2, at 424 (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Id. at 442.
14. Abe's conception of the federal criminal law as a common law system, and his limited
defense of it as such, have also clearly had an impact on judges, who, ironically, frequently
display a more keenly realist sensibility than do academics. See, e.g., McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350, 372-73 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing federal antifraud
provisions as "implicit delegations of authority to courts to fill in the gaps in the common-
law tradition of case-by-case adjudication"); United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06
(1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (describing criminal mail fraud provisions as "a stopgap
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shared one for courts and legislatures (and for juries and prosecutors, too, for
that matter, as Abe also notedl"), and that rather than alternately ignore or
decry this reality we should dedicate ourselves to perfecting it, so that it serves
our ends rather than undermines them. I don't think I would have pieced this
together without Abe; and I know if I hadn't, my scholarly engagement with
the field of criminal law would have been severely stunted.
It is a theme of the literary study of the classics that the great epic poets, in
the guise of immortalizing the heroes whose actions they chronicled, were
actually motivated to immortalize themselves through the creation of lasting
and celebrated works. This ambition to live forever through the influence of
one's ideas is sometimes offered as an explanation for the heroic labors of
scholars.
Yet this account clearly doesn't explain Abe. I have seen plenty of academic
glory seekers. Abe wasn't one. He was as modest as he was brilliant. Although
he ended up achieving a fair measure of it, the idea of acquiring fame -much
less immortal fame-I'm sure never occurred to him as he wrote The Insanity
Defense, Conspiracy To Defraud the United States, and other works.
There's another species of motivation, also featured in the classics, that I
think comes much closer to explaining Abe as a scholar. This is the form of
friendship enjoyed by those who mutually and reciprocally dedicate themselves
to one another's realization of the good life. Abe committed himself to
scholarship in the spirit of this type of friendship with other scholars. He was
motivated to form and share insight not for the sake of distinguishing himself
(much less for the sake of enriching himselfl) but sheerly for the sake of
enlightening others whom he recognized were similarly committed to a life of
gaining insight and sharing it.
I was privileged to enjoy this scholarly friendship with Abe, wholly apart
from the rewarding personal friendship I formed with him during our years
together on the Yale Law School faculty. And it pleases me to know that,
because of Abe's selfless dedication to gaining and sharing insight with other
scholars, the ranks of those who can enjoy this scholarly friendship with him
will indeed continue to grow well into the future.
Dan M. Kahan is the Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor of Law and Deputy Dean,
Yale Law School.
device to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon, until particularized
legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly with the evil").
15. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 436, 44o.
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